

Compositional Verification of Secure Applet Interactions

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Introduction

- Growing interest in verification of (control flow based) security properties
- New generation of multi-application smart cards: [post-issuance loading](#) of applets
- [Decomposition](#) of properties desirable (also useful for management of verification)

A framework for compositional verification

- Program model
- Temporal logic specification language + high level patterns
- Proof system to show correctness of decomposition

Background

- **VerifiCard** project: reasoning about JavaCard
- Representation of program as **call-transfer graph** (Jensen, Le Métayer, Thorn, 1999)
- **Context Free Processes**: efficient model checking algorithms (polynomial in the size of the CFP) (Burkart & Steffen, 1992, Esparza & Schwoon, 2001)
- **Compositional** proof systems for modal μ -calculus (Dam & Gurov, 1998)


A framework for compositional verification

- Program model
- Temporal logic specification language + high level patterns
- Proof system to show correctness of decomposition

Running example: electronic purse

- Three applets: purse + 2 loyalties (AirFrance, RentACar)
- Purse keeps log table of transactions
- Loyalties can subscribe to logFull service
- AirFrance subscribed, RentACar not subscribed
- logFull: AirFrance asks purse for transactions, and RentACar for balance
- RentACar deduces that log table is full

Electronic purse: bad scenario



The program model

Compositional program model


- Program: set of applets, communicating via method invocations and returns
- External program points
- Applet: transfer graph + call graph
- Each applet: local control stack
- Global state: well-formed set of local states
- Transition rules induce operational semantics

Formally

$$\mathcal{M} \triangleq (A, V; \mathbf{app}, \mathbf{ret}; \rightarrow^T, \rightarrow^C)$$

- A a set of applets
- vertices V are program points
- $\mathbf{app}: V \rightarrow A$ attributes vertices to applets
- set of return vertices identified by \mathbf{ret}
- program = transfer graph \rightarrow^T + call graph \rightarrow^C , distributed over different applets

Example compositional model for electronic purse



Operational semantics

- Two sets of transition rules:
 - Applet transition rules
 - Transition rules to combine behaviour of sets of applets
- Transition labels denote method invocations and returns
 - Perfect actions: internal flow or method invocation/return local to applet set (call, ret)
 - Imperfect actions: method invocation/return over applet set boundaries (call?, call!, ret?, ret!)
- Imperfect actions can synchronise, forming perfect actions

Local state per applet

Every applet has local state: list of pairs, representing the control stack

Example: local states in the Purse

When `AF.logFull.Med1` has been reached:

- $\text{Purse}.\pi = \langle \text{User.P}, \text{P.debit.Med} \rangle \cdot \langle \text{P.debit.Med}, \text{AF.logFull} \rangle$
- $\text{AirFrance}.\pi = \langle \text{P.debit.Med}, \text{AF.logFull.Med1} \rangle$
- $\text{RentACar}.\pi = \epsilon$

States formally

- An **applet state** of \mathcal{M} is a pair $a.\pi$, where $a \in A$ and $\pi \in (V \times V)^*$
- A **program state** of \mathcal{M} is a wellformed collection $a_1.\pi_1 | a_2.\pi_2 | \dots | a_n.\pi_n$ of applet states.

Active

- $a.\pi$ is **active** iff the last program point in π is local to applet a
- A program state is called **active** iff it contains an active applet state.


Wellformedness condition on program states

A program state is **wellformed** iff

- each applet name is **mentioned** at most once
- at most one applet is **active**

Example applet transition rule: send call

$$[\text{send call}] \frac{v_1 \xrightarrow{C} v_2 \quad \text{loc}_a v_1 \quad \neg \text{loc}_a v_2}{a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call! } v_2} a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle}$$



Applet transition rules

$$\text{[local call]} \quad \frac{v_1 \xrightarrow{C} v_2 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_1 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_2}{a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call } v_2} a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1, \cdot \rangle \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle}$$


$$\text{[local return]} \quad \frac{v_1 \xrightarrow{T} v_2 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_1 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_3 \quad \mathbf{ret } v_3}{a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle \cdot \langle v_1, v_3 \rangle \xrightarrow{v_3 \text{ ret } v_1} a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_2 \rangle}$$

$$\text{[local transfer]} \quad \frac{v_1 \xrightarrow{T} v_2 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_1 \quad v_1 \not\xrightarrow{C}}{a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle \longrightarrow a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_2 \rangle}$$

$$\begin{array}{l}
\text{[send call]} \quad \frac{v_1 \rightarrow^C v_2 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_1 \quad \neg \mathbf{loc}_a v_2}{a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call! } v_2} a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle} \\
\text{[receive call]} \quad \frac{v_1 \rightarrow^C v_2 \quad \neg \mathbf{loc}_a v_1 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_2 \quad \neg \text{active } a}{a.\pi \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call? } v_2} a.\pi \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle} \\
\text{[send return]} \quad \frac{\neg \mathbf{loc}_a v_1 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_2 \quad \text{return } v_2}{a.\pi \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{v_2 \text{ ret! } v_1} a.\pi} \\
\text{[receive return]} \quad \frac{v_1 \rightarrow^T v_2 \quad \mathbf{loc}_a v_1 \quad \neg \mathbf{loc}_a v_3 \quad \alpha(v_3) = \alpha(v_4)}{a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle \cdot \langle v_1, v_3 \rangle \xrightarrow{v_4 \text{ ret? } v_1} a.\pi \cdot \langle v, v_2 \rangle}
\end{array}$$

Local trace AirFrance applet

AirFrance:




Transition rules for composite states

$$[\text{tau}] \frac{\mathcal{A}_1 \xrightarrow{\tau} \mathcal{A}'_1}{\mathcal{A}_1 \mid \mathcal{A}_2 \xrightarrow{\tau} \mathcal{A}'_1 \mid \mathcal{A}_2}$$

$$[\text{synchron}] \frac{\mathcal{A}_1 \xrightarrow{v_1 \ell? v_2} \mathcal{A}'_1 \quad \mathcal{A}_2 \xrightarrow{v_1 \ell! v_2} \mathcal{A}'_2}{\mathcal{A}_1 \mid \mathcal{A}_2 \xrightarrow{v_1 \ell v_2} \mathcal{A}'_1 \mid \mathcal{A}'_2} \ell \in \text{call, ret}$$

$$[\text{propagation}] \frac{\mathcal{A}_1 \xrightarrow{v_1 \ell?! v_2} \mathcal{A}'_1 \quad \neg \text{loc}_{\mathcal{A}_2} v_1 \quad \neg \text{loc}_{\mathcal{A}_2} v_2}{\mathcal{A}_1 \mid \mathcal{A}_2 \xrightarrow{v_1 \ell?! v_2} \mathcal{A}'_1 \mid \mathcal{A}_2}$$

Fragment of the global trace



The properties

Behavioural applet properties

- m_1 never triggers m_2 (confidentiality, integrity)
- m_1 never triggers m_2 when it triggers m_3 (exclusion)
- m_1 only triggers m_2 through m_3 (segregation of duty)
- m_1 never triggers m_2 before m_3 (authentication)

Specifying the electronic purse system

Invocation of `logFull` in AirFrance applet by Purse
should **not trigger**
a **call** from RentACar to `getTrs` (to ask the transactions) in Purse:

SPEC \triangleq WITHIN AirFrance.logFull
CANNOTCALL RentACar Purse.getTrs

Formulae

$$\phi ::= \sigma \mid \text{active} \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \forall x.\phi \mid [\alpha]\phi \mid X \mid \nu X.\phi$$

with standard semantics, and:

$$\|\text{active}\|_{\rho}^{\mathcal{M}} \triangleq \{s \in \mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid s \text{ is active}\}$$

$$\|\sigma\|_{\rho}^{\mathcal{M}} \triangleq \text{if } \llbracket \sigma \rrbracket_{\rho}^{\mathcal{M}} \text{ then } \mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{M}} \text{ else } \emptyset$$

Atomic formulae

$$\sigma ::= t = t \mid$$
$$\text{return } v \mid$$
$$\text{local}_{\mathcal{A}} v$$

with semantics

$$\llbracket t_1 = t_2 \rrbracket_{\rho}^{\mathcal{M}} \triangleq t_1\rho = t_2\rho$$
$$\llbracket \text{return } v \rrbracket_{\rho}^{\mathcal{M}} \triangleq \mathbf{ret}(v\rho)$$
$$\llbracket \text{local}_{\mathcal{A}} v \rrbracket_{\rho}^{\mathcal{M}} \triangleq \mathbf{app}(v\rho) \text{ occurs in } \mathcal{A}\rho$$

Specification patterns

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{ALWAYS } \phi &\triangleq \\
 \nu X. \phi &\wedge [\tau] X \\
 &\wedge \forall v_1. \forall v_2. [v_1 \text{ call } v_2] X \\
 &\quad \wedge [v_1 \text{ call? } v_2] X \\
 &\quad \wedge [v_1 \text{ call! } v_2] X \\
 &\quad \wedge [v_1 \text{ ret } v_2] X \\
 &\quad \wedge [v_1 \text{ ret? } v_2] X \\
 &\quad \wedge [v_1 \text{ ret! } v_2] X
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{WITHIN } v \phi &\triangleq \\
 \forall v_1. [v_1 \text{ call } v] \text{ ALWAYS}_{\text{-ret } v_1} \phi \\
 \wedge [v_1 \text{ call? } v] \text{ ALWAYS}_{\text{-ret! } v_1} \phi
 \end{aligned}$$

$\text{ALWAYS}_{\text{-}\lambda v} \phi$ is $\text{ALWAYS } \phi$ with $[v_1 \lambda v_2] X$ replaced by $[v_1 \lambda v_2] ((v_2 = v) \vee X)$.

Specifying the individual applets

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SPEC}_P &\triangleq \text{local}_{\text{Purse}} \text{Purse.getTrs} \wedge \\ &\text{ALWAYS } (\text{WITHIN } \text{Purse.getTrs} \\ &\quad (\text{CALLSEXTONLY } \emptyset)) \\ \text{SPEC}_{AF} &\triangleq \text{local}_{\text{AirFrance}} \text{AirFrance.logFull} \wedge \\ &\text{ALWAYS } (\text{WITHIN } \text{AirFrance.logFull} \\ &\quad (\text{CALLSEXTONLY } \text{Purse.getTrs}, \\ &\quad \text{RentACar.getBalance})) \\ \text{SPEC}_{RaC} &\triangleq \text{local}_{\text{RentACar}} \text{RentACar.getBalance} \wedge \\ &\text{ALWAYS } (\text{WITHIN } \text{RentACar.getBalance} \\ &\quad (\text{CALLSEXTONLY } \emptyset)) \end{aligned}$$

Correctness of the decomposition

- Parameterize specifications:
 - replace concrete applet names by applet variables
 - replace concrete method names by program point variables
- Prove:

$$\begin{array}{l} a_P.\pi_P : \text{SPEC}_P, \\ a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} : \text{SPEC}_{AF}, \\ a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{SPEC}_{RaC} \end{array} \vdash a_P.\pi_P \mid a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{SPEC}$$

The proof system

Proof system

- Proof rules for different kind of assertions
 - atomic formula assertion σ
 - satisfaction assertion $\mathcal{A} : \phi$
 - transition assertion $\mathcal{A}_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mathcal{A}_2$
 - transfer-edge assertion $v \xrightarrow{T} v'$
 - call-edge assertion $v \xrightarrow{C} v'$
- **Fixed points** handled with discharge condition (Dam/Gurov)
- Modal operators introduce transition assertions, transition rules introduce edge assertions

Sequents

$$\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n \vdash \delta_1, \dots, \delta_n$$

has intuitive meaning

$$\gamma_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \gamma_n \Rightarrow \delta_1 \vee \dots \vee \delta_n$$

Proof system – Active rules

$$\text{(ActL)} \quad \frac{\Gamma, \Pi = \pi \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle, \text{local}_a v_2 \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, a.\Pi : \text{active} \vdash \Delta} \text{fresh } \pi, v_1, v_2$$

$$\text{(ActR)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Pi = \Pi' \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle, \Delta \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{local}_a v_2, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash a.\Pi : \text{active}, \Delta}$$

Proof system – Box rules

$$\text{(BoxL)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A} \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mathcal{A}', \Delta \quad \Gamma, \mathcal{A}' : \phi \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \mathcal{A} : [\alpha] \phi \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\text{(BoxR)} \quad \frac{\Gamma, \mathcal{A} \xrightarrow{\alpha} \mathcal{X} \vdash \mathcal{X} : \phi, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A} : [\alpha] \phi, \Delta} \text{fresh } \mathcal{X}$$

Proof system – Transition rules

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \Gamma \vdash v_1 \rightarrow^C v_2, \Delta \\
 \Gamma \vdash \text{local}_a v_1, \Delta \\
 \Gamma, \text{local}_a v_2 \vdash \Delta \\
 \Gamma \vdash \Pi = \pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle, \Delta \\
 \hline
 \Gamma \vdash a.\Pi \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call! } v_2} a.(\Pi \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle), \Delta
 \end{array}$$

(SendCallR)

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \Gamma[a.(\Pi \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle)/\mathcal{X}], \\
 \Pi = \pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle, \\
 v_1 \rightarrow^C v_2, \text{local}_a v_1 \vdash \text{local}_a v_2, \Delta[a.(\Pi \cdot \langle v_1, v_2 \rangle)/\mathcal{X}] \\
 \hline
 \Gamma, a.\Pi \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call! } v_2} \mathcal{X} \vdash \Delta
 \end{array}$$

(SendCallL) fresh v, π

Proof system - Composite transition rules

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \Gamma[(\mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{A}_2) / \mathcal{X}], \mathcal{A}_1 \xrightarrow{v_1 l v_2} \mathcal{Y}, \text{wf}(\mathcal{A}_1 | \mathcal{A}_2), \text{wf}(\mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{A}_2) \vdash \text{local}_{\mathcal{A}_2} v_1, \text{local}_{\mathcal{A}_2} v_2, \Delta[(\mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{A}_2) / \mathcal{X}] \\
 \Gamma[(\mathcal{A}_1 | \mathcal{Y}) / \mathcal{X}], \mathcal{A}_2 \xrightarrow{v_1 l v_2} \mathcal{Y}, \text{wf}(\mathcal{A}_1 | \mathcal{A}_2), \text{wf}(\mathcal{A}_1 | \mathcal{Y}) \vdash \text{local}_{\mathcal{A}_1} v_1, \text{local}_{\mathcal{A}_1} v_2, \Delta[(\mathcal{A}_1 | \mathcal{Y}) / \mathcal{X}] \\
 \Gamma[(\mathcal{X}_1 | \mathcal{X}_2) / \mathcal{X}], \mathcal{A}_1 \xrightarrow{v_1 l! v_2} \mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{A}_2 \xrightarrow{v_1 l? v_2} \mathcal{X}_2, \text{wf}(\mathcal{A}_1 | \mathcal{A}_2), \text{wf}(\mathcal{X}_1 | \mathcal{X}_2) \vdash \Delta[(\mathcal{X}_1 | \mathcal{X}_2) / \mathcal{X}] \\
 \Gamma[(\mathcal{X}_1 | \mathcal{X}_2) / \mathcal{X}], \mathcal{A}_1 \xrightarrow{v_1 l? v_2} \mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{A}_2 \xrightarrow{v_1 l! v_2} \mathcal{X}_2, \text{wf}(\mathcal{A}_1 | \mathcal{A}_2), \text{wf}(\mathcal{X}_1 | \mathcal{X}_2) \vdash \Delta[(\mathcal{X}_1 | \mathcal{X}_2) / \mathcal{X}]
 \end{array}
 \quad \text{fresh } \mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{X}_2, \mathcal{Y}$$

$$\Gamma, \mathcal{A}_1 | \mathcal{A}_2 \xrightarrow{v_1 l v_2} \mathcal{X} \vdash \Delta$$

Correctness

- **Soundness:**
 - Formalisation of program model and operational semantics
 - Formalisation of proof system
 - Proof rules sound *w.r.t.* the underlying semantics
 - All in PVS
- **Completeness:** future work

Example verification

The method

Prove

$$\begin{array}{l} a_P.\pi_P : \text{SPEC}_P, \\ a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} : \text{SPEC}_{AF}, \\ a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{SPEC}_{RaC} \end{array} \vdash a_P.\pi_P \mid a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{SPEC}$$

by

- **symbolic execution** to compute symbolic next states
- **identification** of impossible states
- **loop detection** to close off branches in proof

Some abbreviations

$\text{SPEC} \triangleq \text{WITHIN AirFrance.logFull SPEC}'$

$\text{SPEC}' \triangleq \text{CANNOTCALL RentACar Purse.getTrs}$

$\text{SPEC}_P \triangleq \text{local}_{\text{Purse}} \text{Purse.getTrs} \wedge \text{SPEC}'_P$

$\text{SPEC}'_P \triangleq \text{ALWAYS (WITHIN Purse.getTrs (CALLSEXTONLY } \emptyset))$

Some abbreviations - 2

$\text{SPEC}_{\text{AF}} \triangleq \text{local}_{\text{AirFrance}} \text{AirFrance.logFull} \wedge \text{SPEC}'_{\text{AF}}$

$\text{SPEC}'_{\text{AF}} \triangleq \text{ALWAYS (WITHIN AirFrance.logFull SPEC''_{\text{AF}})}$

$\text{SPEC}''_{\text{AF}} \triangleq \text{CALLSEXTONLY Purse.getTrs, RentACar.getBalance}$

$\text{SPEC}_{\text{RaC}} \triangleq \text{local}_{\text{RentACar}} \text{RentACar.getBalance} \wedge \text{SPEC}'_{\text{RaC}}$

$\text{SPEC}'_{\text{RaC}} \triangleq \text{ALWAYS (WITHIN RentACar.getBalance (CALLSEXTONLY } \emptyset))$

Step 1

- Unfold pattern
- Apply logical rules to outermost logical connectives of SPEC
- Two subgoals: focus on first

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{local}_{a_P} v_{GT}, \text{local}_{a_{AF}} v_{LF}, \text{local}_{a_{RaC}} v_{GB}, \\ a_P.\pi_P : \text{SPEC}'_P, a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} : \text{SPEC}'_{AF}, a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{SPEC}'_{RaC} \\ \vdash a_P.\pi_P \mid a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : [v_1 \text{ call } v_{LF}] \text{ ALWAYS}_{\text{-ret } v_1} \text{SPEC}' \end{array}$$

Apply rule BoxR and left transition rules

- Result: nine sequents – nine different ways in which a perfect call action can come about
- Four subgoals discarded by Id: a_{AF} is not involved in communication
- Two subgoals assume a_{AF} sends a call to an external v_{LF} , discarded by SendCallL and Id.
- Three subgoals consider the different ways of producing a perfect call to vertex v_{LF}

v_{LF} is invoked by a local call

$$\begin{array}{c} a_P.\pi_P : \text{SPEC}'_P, \\ a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} : \text{SPEC}'_{AF}, \\ a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{SPEC}'_{RaC}, \\ a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call } v_{LF}} \mathcal{X}, \\ \text{wf}(a_P.\pi_P \mid a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC}), \\ \text{wf}(a_P.\pi_P \mid \mathcal{X} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC}), \\ \text{local}_{a_P} v_{GT}, \\ \text{local}_{a_{AF}} v_{LF}, \\ \text{local}_{a_{RaC}} v_{GB} \vdash \\ a_P.\pi_P \mid \mathcal{X} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{ALWAYS}_{\text{-ret } v_1} \text{SPEC}' \end{array}$$

Deriving assumptions about \mathcal{X}

- Apply l.h.s. rules
- Apply BoxL to box-formula labeled v_1 call v_{LF} .
- First subgoal: show $a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call } v_{LF}} \mathcal{X}$ by Id
- Second subgoal:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{local}_{a_P} v_{GT}, \text{ local}_{a_{AF}} v_{LF}, \text{ local}_{a_{RaC}} v_{GB}, \\
 & a_P.\pi_P : \text{SPEC}'_P, \mathcal{X} : \text{ALWAYS}_{\text{-ret } v_1} \text{SPEC}''_{AF}, a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{SPEC}'_{RaC}, \\
 & a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \xrightarrow{v_1 \text{ call } v_{LF}} \mathcal{X}, \\
 & \text{wf}(a_P.\pi_P \mid a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC}), \text{ wf}(a_P.\pi_P \mid \mathcal{X} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC}) \\
 & \vdash a_P.\pi_P \mid \mathcal{X} \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC} : \text{ALWAYS}_{\text{-ret } v_1} \text{SPEC}'
 \end{aligned}$$

Eliminate transition assertion by LocCall

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{local}_{a_P} v_{GT}, \\
 \text{local}_{a_{AF}} v_{LF}, \\
 \text{local}_{a_{AF}} v_1, \\
 \text{local}_{a_{RaC}} v_{GB}, \\
 a_P \cdot \pi_P : \text{SPEC}'_P, \\
 a_{AF} \cdot \pi_{AF} \cdot \langle v_1, v_{LF} \rangle : \text{ALWAYS}_{\text{-ret } v_1} \text{SPEC}''_{AF}, \\
 a_{RaC} \cdot \pi_{RaC} : \text{SPEC}'_{RaC}, \\
 \pi_{AF} = \pi \cdot \langle v, v_1 \rangle, \\
 v_1 \xrightarrow{C} v_{LF}, \\
 \text{wf}(a_P \cdot \pi_P \mid a_{AF} \cdot \pi_{AF} \mid a_{RaC} \cdot \pi_{RaC}), \\
 \text{wf}(a_P \cdot \pi_P \mid a_{AF} \cdot \pi_{AF} \cdot \langle v_1, v_{LF} \rangle \mid a_{RaC} \cdot \pi_{RaC}) \quad \vdash \\
 a_P \cdot \pi_P \mid a_{AF} \cdot \pi_{AF} \cdot \langle v_1, v_{LF} \rangle \mid a_{RaC} \cdot \pi_{RaC} : \text{ALWAYS}_{\text{-ret } v_1} \text{SPEC}'
 \end{array}$$

Analysis of symbolic next-state

- Computed next-state:

$$a_P.\pi_P \mid a_{AF}.\pi_{AF} \cdot \langle v_1, v_{LF} \rangle \mid a_{RaC}.\pi_{RaC}$$

- Show in this symbolic next-state formula $ALWAYS_{-ret\ v_1} SPEC'$ holds:
 - In **this** state $SPEC'$ is true: trivial, because of wellformedness.
 - In all **possible next states** within the call (not labeled **$v\ ret\ v_1$**) $ALWAYS_{-ret\ v_1} SPEC'$ holds.
 - External call:** only two possible destinations of call v_{GT} or v_{GB}
 - Continue** with these states
 - Other cases:** loop and discharge

Ongoing and future work

- Maximal graph construction - completeness for a fragment of the logic
- Concurrency
- Keep notion of method in program model
- Extension of Erlang Verification Tool
- Verification of individual applets
- Case studies