


Timing is Everything — the Importance of History Detection

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Attack Demonstration



Attack Demonstration

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...I SUBMIT FOR PEER REVIEW

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
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
The Kittens of... VIDEO: Baby Stuff...

Attack Demonstration




*Works equally well with other navigation (bookmark, link, ...)


Attack Demonstration



Attack Demonstration



Attack Demonstration



Attack Summary

- ▶ Evil tab was able to control victim tab
- ▶ Even after user had navigated victim tab manually
- ▶ Was able to control timing to when user navigated to site
- ▶ Multiple attack scenarios building on this
- ▶ Intercepts user's browsing flow: *Flow Stealing*

How the Redirect Works

- ▶ Evil tab runs malicious JavaScript
- ▶ Victim tab is opened from Evil tab
- ▶ Evil tab retains a JavaScript window handle
- ▶ Via window handle, Evil tab can navigate Victim tab
- ▶ No restrictions on such navigation, except in Opera

How does the Evil Tab Know when to Redirect?



- ▶ Evil tab needs to know when to redirect
- ▶ Fairly easy if it can see victim's network traffic
- ▶ (Actually easier than in paper - use XHR Level 2)
- ▶ In most web attacks, we cannot see victim's network traffic
- ▶ What can we learn from history?

History Detection

- ▶ A history detection attack allows attacker to test if victim has visited some URL
- ▶ Violates visitor's privacy expectation
 - ▶ Did you visit competitor's site?
 - ▶ What are your surfing habits?
 - ▶ Where do you live (did you check out the weather in Stockholm) [Janc, Olejnik'10]?

Did you watch porn?

Did you watch porn?

didyouwatchporn.com

WTF FAQ PRIVACY SUBMIT URLS THE LIST

NO YOU DIDN'T

GOOD BOY! YOU DIDN'T WATCH ANY PORN RECENTLY.
Unless, of course, we are wrong.

Now find out [what your friends watched](#) :)

SEE WHAT YOUR FRIENDS WATCHED


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A Historical History Detection Attack

- ▶ CSS history detection is a well known attack
- ▶ Visited links are rendered differently from unvisited
- ▶ `evil.com` wants to know if visitor has visited `gmail.com`
 - ▶ Use CSS to make visited links render differently from unvisited
 - ▶ Add link to `gmail.com`
 - ▶ Have JavaScript that determines how link was rendered

History of the attack



The screenshot shows a web browser window displaying the Mozilla Bugzilla page for Bug 57351. The browser's address bar shows the URL https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=57351. The page title is "Bugzilla@Mozilla - Bug 57351" and the subtitle is "css on a:visited can load an image and/or reveal if visitor been to a site". The page is last modified on 2009-10-17 23:04:06 PDT. The bug title is "Bug 57351 - css on a:visited can load an image and/or reveal if visitor been to a site". The status is "VERIFIED DUPLICATE of bug-147777". The reported date is 2000-10-19 16:57 PDT by Jesse Ruderman. The modified date is 2009-10-17 23:04 PDT. The crash signature is "All All". The importance is "P3 major with 2 votes". The target milestone is "mozilla1.2alpha". The assigned to is "Mitchell Stoltz (not reading bugmail)". The QA contact is "ckritzer (gone)". The URL is "http://gemal.dk/browserspy/css.html". The duplicates are "127641 (view as bug list)". The depends on and blocks sections are empty. The attachments section is also empty.

Bugzilla@Mozilla - Bug 57351 css on a:visited can load an image and/or reveal if visitor been to a site Last modified: 2009-10-17 23:04:06 PDT

Home | New | Browse | Search | Search [?] | Reports | Requests | Help | New Account | Log In | Forgot Password

First Last Prev Next This bug is not in your last search results.

Bug 57351 - css on a:visited can load an image and/or reveal if visitor been to a site [Last Comment](#)

Status: VERIFIED DUPLICATE of [bug-147777](#) **Reported:** 2000-10-19 16:57 PDT by Jesse Ruderman

Whiteboard: **Modified:** 2009-10-17 23:04 PDT ([History](#))

Keywords: privacy, testcase **CC List:** 11 users ([show](#))

Product: Core **See Also:**

Component: Security

Version: Trunk

Platform: All All **Crash Signature:**

Importance: P3 major with 2 votes ([vote](#))

Target Milestone: mozilla1.2alpha

Assigned To: Mitchell Stoltz (not reading bugmail)

QA Contact: ckritzer (gone)

URL: <http://gemal.dk/browserspy/css.html>

Duplicates: [127641 \(view as bug list\)](#)

Depends on:

Blocks: Show dependency [tree](#) / [graph](#)

Attachments

History of the attack

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
Attachments

Plugging the CSS History Detection Hole

- ▶ A solution was proposed in [Baron '10]
 - ▶ Lie to JavaScript about link colors
 - ▶ Restrict what rendering visited can affect (timing attacks, etc.)
- ▶ Now used in latest versions of most major browsers
- ▶ ... but not Opera or IE8 (last for Windows XP)

From Past to Present

- ▶ How to we use this to time our attack?
- ▶ Polling!
- ▶ Periodically test target URLs
- ▶ When one becomes visited, trigger redirect



Limitations

- ▶ Can only trigger on URLs which
 - ▶ we can guess (no long, random parameter)
 - ▶ start out unvisited (!)
- ▶ CSS History Detection is patched in most browsers
- ▶ Seems difficult to build on other history detection attacks
 - ▶ Cache timing attacks are one-shot
 - ▶ Attacks where user is involved are too slow

Preventing Future Flow Stealing

- ▶ Even without history detection, network attacks still work
- ▶ Can we prevent the actual redirection?
- ▶ Yes, updating JavaScript window handle navigation policy
- ▶ Opera restrict cross-site navigation when current page in victim tab uses https



Proposed new JavaScript Policy

- ▶ What is an appropriate policy for when a tab can navigate another?

Proposed new JavaScript Policy

- ▶ What is an appropriate policy for when a tab can navigate another?
- ▶ Should correspond to users' expectations for when pages can be changed
- ▶ Proposal: re-use Popup-blocker policy
- ▶ All browsers have one
- ▶ Appears to work reasonably well in practice



Summary

- ▶ Flow stealing — new type of attack
- ▶ New use of history detection
- ▶ Suggested stricter JavaScript window navigation policy

Thank you! Questions?
gkreitz@kth.se

