Game Theory - Introduction

Henrik I Christensen

Introduction to Game Theory

Part of Topics in Robotics (3p)

Contents:

Strategic Games

  1. Nash Equilibrium
  2. Mixed, correlated and evolutionary equilibrium
  3. Rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions
  4. Knowledge and Equilibrium

Extensive games with perfect information

  1. Extensive games with perfect information
  2. Bargaining games
  3. Repeated games
  4. Complexity considerations in repeated games
  5. Implementation theory

Extensive games with imperfect information

  1. Extensive games with imperfect information
  2. Sequential Equilibrium

Coalition Games

  1. The core
  2. Stable sets, the bargaining set, the sharpley value
  3. The Nash Solution

Litterature

Martin J. Osbourne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994

Additional literature:

Harold W. Kuhn (Ed.) Classics in Game Theory, Princeton University Press, 1997

Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1998

Sarit Kraus, Strategic Negotiation in Multiagent Environments, MIT Press, 2001




File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.01.
On 24 Oct 2001, 22:02.